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The "Initiation" Requirement
of the Fairness Doctrine:
Representative Patsy Mink
In Representative Patsy Mink' the Federal Communications Com-
mission used the "initiation" requirement of the fairness doctrine to
require radio station WHAR of Clarksburg, West Virginia, to provide
news coverage of the ecological, economic, and social ramifications of
strip mining. Mink marks the first time the initiation requirement
has been used to require a broadcaster to initiate coverage of a par-
ticular issue. Part of the decision's significance is that it exposes
and embodies those contradictions inherent in a scheme that is simul-
taneously designed to give broadcasters "wide discretion" while vest-
ing absolute "public interest" discretion in the government in the form
of the fairness doctrine. More importantly, Mink is the clearest
statement to date that broadcasters do not have the same first amend-
ment protection as newspaper editors.
This Case Comment will review the constitutional, statutory, and
administrative-law background to Mink. It will then analyze the de-
cision in light of that background and explore its ramifications for
current broadcast licensees. Finally, an analysis of the first amend-
ment justifications offered for broadcast content regulation will sug-
gest why those justifications are insufficient to legitimize the Commis-
sion's selection of particular programming matter in Mink.
I. BACKGROUND
A. First Amendment
The first amendment approach taken by the Supreme Court of the
United States to news presentation in the broadcasting media is vastly
different from its approach to news presentation in the print media.
News content selection is left entirely to the private editor's discretion
in the print media, while the broadcaster's programming choice is
subject to federal regulation to ensure sufficient coverage of important
issues.
The Supreme Court's attitude toward the print media is charac-
terized in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,2 a case in which
the Court declared unconstitutional a Florida statute mandating a right
to reply to newspaper attacks on candidates for public office. "The
choice of material to go into a newspaper, . . . and [the] treatment
of public issues and public officials . . . constitute the exercise of edi-
torial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how
1. 59 F.C.C.2d 987, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 744 (1976).
2. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised con-
sistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press ....
The Court concluded that "[t]he Florida statute fails to clear the bar-
riers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function
of editors."4  In CBS v. Democratic National Committee the Court
stated that a newspaper's power to advance its own political, social,
and economic views is bounded only by readers' and advertisers'
acceptance, and the "journalistic integrity of its editors and pub-
lishers."5
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC6 reveals the contrasting first
amendment approach to the broadcast media, and incorporates the
"scarcity rationale" that is the foundation of that approach. The
central premise of the scarcity rationale is that, "Unlike other modes
of expression, radio is inherently not available to all. That is its unique
characteristic, and that is why unlike other modes of expression it is
subject to governmental regulation. 7 The Court in Red Lion elabo-
rated on that theme by stating that "the lack of know-how and equip-
ment may keep many from the air, but only a tiny fraction of those
with resources and intelligence can hope to communicate by radio at
the same time."8
Additionally, Red Lion offered the "listeners' rights" theory, an
apparent offshoot of the scarcity rationale, as further justification
for governmental regulation of the broadcast medium: "It is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which
is paramount." 9  Finally, it embellished that theory by noting: "It is
the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail."'(,
B. Radio Communications Acts
The statutory framework for implementing the concepts recognized
in Red Lion began to develop early in the history of radio. Because of
America's historic aversion to censorship, Congress opted not for
3. Id. at 258. Justice White asserted the principle even more vehemently in hi con-
currence: "[P]rior compulsion by government in . .. the decision as to what copy will or will
not be included in any given edition-collides with the First Amendraent," i. at 261.
4. Id. at 258. For a perfect analogue to the Florida statute in the communications hield. e
47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, and 73.679 (1976).
5. 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973).
6. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
7. This reasoning was set forth in NBC v. United States. 319 U.S. 190. 226 (1943), the
first case to explicitly sanction federal regulation of the broadcast media. See Red L ion. 305
U.S. at 388, citing NBC in support of its own reasoning.
8. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367. 388 (1969), While the fundamental
constitutional, statutory, and administrative-law issues are the same in the field of television
as in the field of radio, the scope of this Case Comment will be limit-d to radio broadcasting,
9. Id. at 390.
10. Id. (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)),
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governmental ownership and control of the broadcasting media, but for
a system of private broadcasters licensed and regulated by govern-
ment." In response to the "chaos which ensued from permitting
anyone to use any frequency at whatever power level he wished"' 2
under a 1912 law, 13 Congress in 1927 established the Federal Radio
Commission to allocate frequencies in a manner responsive to the
"public convenience, interest, or necessity." 14
When the Radio Act of 1927 was superseded by the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, the licensees' obligation to operate "in the public
interest" was explicitly carried forward. 15 The 1934 Act, which
created the Federal Communications Commission 16 to replace the
Federal Radio Commission, "does not restrict the Commission
merely to the supervision of traffic. It puts upon the Commission the
burden of determining the composition of that traffic."
17
Simultaneously, however, the 1934 Act explicitly precluded gov-
ernmental censorship of broadcast licensees. 18 The Supreme Court in
Red Lion recognized that provision's constitutional basis by stating
that the first amendment "has a major role to play as the Congress
itself recognized in § 326, which forbids FCC interference 'with the
right of free speech by means of radio communication.' ,19
The Federal Communications Commission, then, must guard the
public interest in news program content by balancing the licensee's
first amendment rights as a "free agent" with the first amendment
rights of the public. 20  In its broad function of overseeing broadcast-
11. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 116 (1973).
12. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
13. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302.
14. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 4, 44 Stat. 1163 (superseded by 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
15. See, e.g., ch. 652, § 307, 48 Stat. 1083 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1970)).
16. Ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
17. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190. 215-16 (1943).
On one occasion, Congress acted directly on broadcast content by passing the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 89 (codified at 15 US.C.
§ 1331-1338, 1335 (1970)). The Act banned all advertising of cigarettes after January I, 1971.
on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Com-
munications Commission. The ban was upheld against first amendment challenge in Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge court). aff'd sub
noma. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
18. Ch. 652, § 326, 48 Stat. 1091 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970)):
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio
station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission
which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.
19. 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
20. The Supreme Court has recognized that both freedom of speech and freedom of
the press apply to radio newscasts. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 32 n.3
(1971). Previously, Red Lion had characterized the broadcaster's rights as an undifferentiated
freedom of speech, while United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) had
characterized their protection as freedom of the press. Justice Stewart has recently suggested
that the press clause affords broadcasters more protection from governmental intrusion than
the speech clause. Stewart, "Or qf the Press," 26 HAsriNGs LI. 631 (1975). See also Nimmer,
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ing, the Commission must thus balance its own constitutional and
statutory power to dispense licenses and deterraine the composition
of broadcast traffic with the conflicting constitutional and statutory
preclusion of censorship.21
C. Fairness Doctrine
1. Development
The primary administrative balancing tool used by the Commis-
sion is the fairness doctrine, the development of which roughly
paralleled the statutory development of broadcast regulation. The
Federal Radio Commission spawned the rudiments of the doctrine as
an embodiment of the 1927 Act's public interest standard: "[T]he
public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition
of opposing views, and the Commission believes that the principle
applies . . . to all discussion of issues of importance to the public."' 2
The first fully developed version of the fairness doctrine was set
forth in the Federal Communications Commission's Report on Edi-
torializing By Broadcast Licensees23 [hereinafter referred to as 1949
Report]: "The Commission has . . . recognized the necessity for li-
censees to devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcast time
to the presentation of news and programs devoted to the consideration
and discussion of public issues of interest in the community served by
the particular station. 24  While the 1949 Report continues to be the
basic source of all subsequent fairness doctrine policy,2 5 the doctrine's
clearest statement is contained in The Handling of Public Issues Under
the Fairness Doctrine and The Public Interest Standards of the Com-
munications Act 26 [hereinafter referfed to as Fairness Report]. There
the Commission said that,
stripped to its barest essentials, the fairness doctrine involves a two-fold
duty: 1) the broadcaster must devote a reasonable percentage of his
broadcast to the coverage of public issues; and 2) his coverage of these
issues must be fair in the sense that it provides an opportunity for the
presentation of contrasting points of view., 27
Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975).
21. "To perform its statutory duties, the Commission must oversee without censoring.
This suggests something of the difficulty and delicacy of adminiktering the Communications
Act." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118 (1973).
22. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32. 33 (1929), rev'd on other
grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930). It should be noted here
that the Commission exercises a broad form of overall subject-matter regulation through the
licensing grant and renewal process. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems By
Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 21 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 1507 (1971),
23. 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
24. Id. at 1249.
25. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 384 t1969).
26. 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 30 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 1261 (1974).
27. Id. at 7, 30 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 1273.
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That is, the broadcaster has a duty to initiate some coverage of public
issues, and after initiation he has a duty to give full play to contrast-
ing views on those issues. The test of what issues impose the broad-
caster's duty is formulated as "controversial issues of public im-
portance. 28
2. Implementation of the Initiation Requirement
Complaints brought before the FCC have almost exclusively in-
volved the scope of the broadcaster's duty under the "full-play" re-
quirement of the fairness doctrine. For that reason, and perhaps
because the FCC has sought to avoid the censor's image which at-
taches to the regulation of program content, there has been virtually
no Commission action regarding the selection of "controversial issues
of public importance" under the initiation requirement of the doc-
trine. 29  Thus, the scope of the broadcaster's duty to initiate coverage
has, until Mink, involved only a nonspecific duty to cover some im-
portant news issues.
Nonetheless, the question of proper implementation of the initia-
tion requirement has not been ignored. The Commission has issued
statements that reflect the divergence between the Commission's
constitutional and statutory duties to, on the one hand, protect the
public interest in the use of broadcasting frequencies and, on the
other hand, to avoid censorship.
On the "composition of traffic" and "listeners' rights" side of the
ledger, a Commission ruling sent to Gary Soucie, who had attacked
the "one-sidedness" of automobile commercials, stated that: "It would
[not be] reasonable for broadcasting to ignore . . . burning issues of
the seventies."30  The Soucie passage was developed in the Fairness
Report. There the Commission stated: "We have, in the past, indi-
cated that some issues are so critical or of such public importance
that it would be unreasonable for a licensee to ignore them com-
28. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969); Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 693, 36 RAD.
REG. (P & F) 2d 1021, 1026 (1976); The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine
and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 11. 30 RAiD
REG. (P & F) 2d 1261, 1278 (1974); 1949 Report, supra note 23, at 1251. It is arguable that in
enforcement of the first half of the doctrine, even noncontroversial issues of public importance
ought to be presented, e.g., the importance of voting. The distinction between controversial
and noncontroversial public issues appears to have evolved through usage in applying the
doctrine's second half, rather than having been formally drawn. See generally 1949 Report,
supra note 23, at 1251. For a discussion of the factors to be considered in determining
whether an issue is a "controversial issue of public importance" for purposes of applying the
second half of the doctrine, see Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d at 11-12, 30 RAD. REG. (P & F)
2d at 1278-79. Hereinafter, the first half of the fairness doctrine will be referred to as the
"initiation" requirement, and the second half will be referred to as the "full play" requirement.
29. For a discussion of the FCC's fear of the censor's image as a factor in the paucity
of initiation enforcement, see Comment, Enforcing the Obligation to Present Controversial
Issues: the Forgotten Halfof the Fairness Doctrine, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 137, 151 (1975).
30. Mr. Gary Soucie, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 750, 19 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 994, 1002 (1970).
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pletely."3  These two statements suggest that the fairness doctrine's
requirement that the licensee "devote a reasonable percentage of his
broadcast time to the coverage of public issues" may be implemented
by requiring the licensee to cover some particular issues selected
from the entire range of issues available. This conclusion might also
be inferred from the language of the initiation requirement. Giving
"reasonable" coverage to public issues can only mean covering some
assortment of particular public issues. Since "a station's primary
obligation is to its city of license, 32 enforcing that general require-
ment could be read to mandate coverage of certain local problems.
Finally, it is only a short step from forcing a licensee to give more
coverage of an issue than it has chosen to give under the full-play
requirement of the fairness doctrine to forcing the licensee to cover an
issue that it has chosen not to cover under the initiation requirement
of the doctrine.3 3
On the anticensorship side of the fairness ledger, 14 the 1949 Re-
port imposed only a vague good faith duty of initiation on the broad-
caster: "The licensee will in each instance be called upon to exercise his
best judgment and good sense in determining wbat subjects should be
considered . . . ."5 A principle from the Commission's Fairness Doc-
trine Primer limits that duty: "In passing on any complaint in this
area, the Commission's role is not to substitute its judgment for that
of the licensee as to any of the above programming decisions .... "36
Finally, the Fairness Report, after suggesting that some issues are so
critical that they must be covered, asserted that "we have no intention
of becoming involved in the selection of issues to be discussed, nor
do we expect a broadcaster to cover each and every important issue
which may arise in his community.
37
II. THE Mink DECISION
On July 8, 1974, United States Representative Patsy Mink of
Hawaii, a sponsor of anti-strip-mining legislation then before Congress,
31. 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 10, 30 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 1261. 1276 (1974).
32. Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27
F.C.C.2d 650, 654, 21 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 1507. 1512 (1971),
33. In 1962 the Commission abandoned its procedure of only undertaking fairness re-
views as a part of the license renewal process. For a discussion of that decision. see NBC v,
FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1115-16 (D.C. Cir. 1974). One rationale for the abandonment was that
the delay until renewal time was unfair to the listening public. rhus. after 1962, inadequate
coverage could be immediately corrected under a Commission suggestion that opposing view-
points deserved more attention than they had already received.
34. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
35. 13 F.C.C. 1246. 1251 (1949).
36. Fairness Doctrine Primer, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599. 2 RD. Pto. (P & F) 2d 1901, 1904
(1964) (emphasis added). The context of the quotation suggests. it is directed to the full-play
fairness requirement. It ssould apply a fortiori to the initiation requirement, particularly since
the Commission has been more cautious in enforcing it than in enforcing the full-play requirement,
37. 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 10, 30 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 1261, 1277 (1974).
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wrote to radio station WHAR in Clarksburg, West Virginia, and sev-
eral other stations, requesting that they broadcast an eleven-minute
tape. The tape contained a proposal that she claimed would con-
trast viewpoints presented in a pro-strip-mining United States Cham-
ber of Commerce program allegedly aired by WHAR. Thus, Repre-
sentative Mink was attempting to capitalize on the broadcasters'
full-play duty. Two days later WHAR returned the tape, stating that
it had presented no coverage on the strip-mining issue-which meant
that no full-play duty existed.
Following another exchange of letters in late July, the Media
Access Project on September 25, 1974, filed a fairness complaint with
the Federal Communications Commission on behalf of Mink, the En-
vironmental Policy Center, and 0. D. Hagedorn, a Clarksburg citizen.3s
The complaint alleged that the licensee failed to air any programming
on the strip-mining controversy in a four month period (the spring and
summer of 1974) during which Congress was debating mining legisla-
tion. . The complaint further alleged that the issue was and con-
tinued to be "of extraordinary controversiality and public importance
to WHAR's listeners."39 In support of their allegations the com-
plainants cited a substantial volume of material, most notably nine
front-page stories in an eleven-day span from the Clarksburg Tele-
gram and coverage of the issue in other area newspapers. They
also submitted evidence that the issue had received coverage in na-
tional periodicals and enclosed a 1971 report compiled by the Appa-
lachian Research & Development Fund, Inc., of Charleston, West
Virginia, stating that the report put all area broadcasters on notice of
the importance of the strip-mining issue. The complaint finally re-
quested the FCC to direct WHAR to immediately schedule sub-
stantial strip-mining programming.40
Three months later, on December I1, 1974, the Commission sent
WHAR a letter of inquiry requesting comment on the complaint.
In its reply of January 13, 1975, WHAR stated that when it told
Mink that it had presented no coverage on the strip-mining contro-
versy, it meant only that no locally oriented programming had been
offered. It stated that it had broadcast whatever strip-mining pro-
gramming had been afforded by the ABC network and Associated
Press news services as a part of its regular programming.
WHAR's reply also argued that even if it had failed to cover the
strip-mining controversy, it would not be answerable to the Commis-
sion because there was no established precedent or rule requiring any
particular licensee to cover any particular issue. The station further
38. Id. at 987, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 745.
39. Id. at 988, 37 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 2d at 745. See generally text accompanying note 28
supra.
40. Id. at 988-89, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 745-46.
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stated that any governmental attempt to determine what issues shall
be treated "enfleshes the specter of censorship.'
On February 4, 1975, WHAR submitted Associated Press tear-
sheet items broadcast during June 1974 in an attempt to substantiate
its claims that it had presented numerous strip-mining news items.
In early April, the complainants sent the FCC further material re-
garding the importance and controversiality of the strip-mining issue.
The sending of correspondence to the Commission ended on June 18,
1975.42
The Commission found that the complainants' extensive sup-
porting material established that the strip-mining controversy was "a
critical controversial issue of public importance in Clarksburg."4  It
further found that WHAR failed to prove that it had covered the
issue." The FCC held "that WHAR has acted unreasonably in failing
to cover the issue of strip mining," and was therefore in violation of
the initiation requirement of the fairness doctrine. The Commission
stated further that "where . ..an issue has significant and possibly
unique impact on the licensee's service area . .. it must be shown
that there has been some attempt to inform the public of the nature of
the controversy, not only that such a controversy exists." WHAR
was given twenty days to inform the Commission on how it intended
"to meet its fairness obligations with respect to adequate coverage of
the aforementioned issue. 45
III. ANALYSIS: USE OF AUTHORITY, RAMIFICATIONS
AND JUSTIFICATIONS
A. Use of Authority
Because of the implicit contradiction between the proposition that
"some issues are so critical they must be covered," on the one hand,
and the proposition that "we have no intention of selecting the issues
to be discussed" on the other, the Commission in Mink could find
support for either requiring or not requiring WHAR to cover the strip-
mining issue. But the Commission reached the former result with
too shallow an analysis for this delicate first amendment area. It
failed to acknowledge that the supporting language it used was only
dicta from previous decisions and that some passages did not address
the question for which they were cited for support. Moreover, it ig-
41. Id. at 989-90, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 747.
42. Id. at 993, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 751.
43. Id. at 995, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 754.
44. Id. at 996-97, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 754-56.
45. Id. at 997, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 756. A September 21, 1976, telephone inter-
view with Mr. James Fawcett, President of WHAR, revealed that the station, rather than appeal
the FCC's ruling, offered ten half-hour time slots for the public to call in to discuss strip min-
ing. Mr. Fawcett reported having received only two calls during the ten periods
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nored the "no selection of issues" line of thought, largely by not men-
tioning it and partly by the simple assertion that it was not selecting
programming for WHAR.
For example, the Commission cited CBS v. Democratic National
Committee for the proposition that "the fairness doctrine 'imposes two
affirmative obligations on the broadcaster: coverage of issues of public
importance must be adequate and must fairly reflect differing view-
points.' ,46 From this one can infer either that the licensee may
choose the particular issues it will cover-and that the nonspecific
nature of the initiation requirement was merely clumsily stated-or
that "adequate coverage" of public issues imposes a duty on the
broadcaster to cover some specific issues. The Commission opted for
the latter inference from the CBS passage, stating: "If the fairness
doctrine is to have any meaningful impact, broadcasters must cover,
at the very least, those topics which are of vital concern to their
listeners."47  However, the Court's pronouncement in CBS is only an-
other version of the fairness statement in the 1949 Report, which makes
clear the nonspecific nature of the initiation requirement. Restating
the generality only presents and does not answer the question of
whether it should be particularized with a necessarily vague "vital
concern" standard. Moreover, the CBS decision involved only the
full-play requirement of the fairness doctrine. Thus, even if the state-
ment could properly be read to require coverage of particular issues,
it is only dicta and should have been recognized as such.
The Commission asserted that action of the type taken in Mink
was contemplated by the Court in Red Lion, citing the Court's declara-
tion that, "If the present licensees should suddenly prove timorous,
the commission is not powerless to insist that they give adequate and
fair attention to public issues.' '4  The Red Lion statement, like that
from CBS, does not answer the crucial question-must the licensee
cover any particular issue? Red Lion's own clarification of the state-
ment says that licensees are not permitted to "exclude from the air-
ways anything but their own views of fundamental questions. The
statute, long administrative practice, and cases are to this effect.
' 49
This statement perhaps weakens the Commission's reading of Red
Lion, for neither the statute,50 long-standing administrative practice,
46. Id. at 993, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 752 (quoting CBS v. Democratic Naft
Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973)).
47. Id, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 752.
48. Id. at 994, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 752-53 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1973)).
49. 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970) deals with air time for candidates for public office. The
portion pertinent to fairness law reads:
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in con-
nection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and
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nor previous cases had required a particular licensee to cover a par-
ticular issue. Finally, the Red Lion material cited in Mink is, like
the CBS statement, dicta-the decision involved the full-play require-
ment, not the initiation requirement of the fairness doctrine.ii
Shortly after its reference to Red Lion, the Commission stated
that "[t]he question of whether a licensee has presented significant
coverage of vital issues of public importance, which has been found
to be necessary to fully inform the public, has been the subject of
previous Commission action. The first case cited for that proposi-
tion, Committee For The Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues,"
involved several related full-play fairness complaints requesting time
to reply to previous Vietnam war coverage, and did not incorporate
any discussion of the initiation requirement. The second case, WSNT,
Inc.,54 also distinctly limited its fairness doctrine discussion to the
application of the full-play requirement to an issue that had been
previously covered.
In Mr. Gary Soucie55 the Commission stated that "it would be
no more reasonable for broadcasting to ignore .. .burning issues of
the seventies-which may determine the quality of life for decades or
centuries to come-than it would be to ignore the issue of . . . racial
unrest in communities racked by this problem." 6  In a manner sug-
gesting heavy reliance on Soucie, the Commission concluded in Mink
that "WHAR has acted unreasonably in failing to cover the issue of
strip mining, an issue which clearly may determine the quality of life
in Clarksburg for decades to come.""7  Interestingly, the Commission
in Mink failed to reveal that Soucie had involved only a full-play fair-
ness requirement, the complainants having pressed for the right to
present "the other side" of automobile and gasoline commercials.
Moreover, the Commission said in Soucie: "We wish to emphasize
that our ruling is restricted to the general product advertisement." 58
on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under
this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
51. At issue was an application of the Commission's personal-attack regulations, which
are cited in note 4 supra.
52. 59 F.C.C.2d at 994, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 753.
53. 25 F.C.C.2d 283, 19 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 1103 (1970),
54. 27 F.C.C.2d 993, 21 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 405 (1971).
55. 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 19 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 994 (1970).
56. Id. at 750-51, 19 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 1002 (1970) (emphasis added).
57. 59 F.C.C. at 997, 27 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 756 (emphasis added), The inference
of reliance arising from language similarity is corroborated by the foet that the Fairncvs, Rel'ort.
cited as authority for the proposition that some issues are so critical that they must be
covered (see 59 F.C.C.2d at 994, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 753). explicitly cites Souti a1s
the source of that idea. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d I, 10. 30 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 2d 1261, 1276
(1974). See text accompanying note 31 supra.
58. 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 749 19 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 994. 1001 (1970).
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The most disturbing aspect of Mink is its handling of previous
authority that is contrary to the result reached. The Commission in
Mink failed to mention the Fairness Doctrine Primer's statement that
"the Commission's role is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
licensee."59  Conscious recognition of the Primer's idea would have
logically precluded the Commission's particular implementation of its
judgment that WHAR had acted unreasonably, as would have refer-
ence to the Fairness Report's statement that "we have no intention of
becoming involved in the selection of issues to be discussed." 6
Early in the Mink decision the Commission at least verbally
recognized the underlying theme of those two statements: "The Com-
mission . . has no intention of intruding on licensee's day-to-day
editorial decision-making. 61  The Commission correctly explained
this statement by equating involvement in daily decision-making with
the censorship that is precluded by 47 U.S.C. § 326.62 Later, however,
the Commission made a self-contradictory statement:
While it would be an exceptional situation and would not counter our
intention to stay out of decisions concerning the selection of specific
programming matter, we believe that the unreasonable exercise of the
licensee discretion, i.e., failure to adequately cover a "critical issue" in a
particular community, would require appropriate remedial action on the
part of the Commission.63
True, the "appropriate remedial action" taken in Mink was excep-
tional. But it would be sophistic to say that it did not involve the
selection of specific programming matter. Although the Commission
is not deciding precisely what will be said, there is no principled dis-
tinction between doing that and choosing the topics to be covered in
light of the requirement that full play be given to opposing viewpoints.
By reaching its result in Mink, the Commission would apparently
have us believe that a little content selection, i.e., censorship, is really
none at all. However, any issue a licensee is forced to cover will have
to be covered on some particular day. The Commission will have
intruded on the licensee's decisionmaking at least on that day and to
that extent. The number of days on which the intrusion occurs can
only alter the degree, not the fact, of censorship.
59. 40 F.C.C. 598, 599, 2 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 1901, 1904 (1964).
60. 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 10, 30 RAD REG. (P & F) 2d 1261, 1277 (1974).
61. 59 F.C.C.2d at 994, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 752.
62. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970)). For the text of the statute see note 18 supra. While
censorship technically means the deletion of undesired material, it was judicially defined as
"the denial of the right of freedom of the press and the right of freedom of speech" in Esquire
v. Walker, 55 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (1944). This paper uses the term "censorship" in the Esquire
sense to include governmentally forced inclusion of subject matter as well as its deletion.
63. 59 F.C.C.2d at 994, 37 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d at 752 (emphasis added).
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B. Immediate Ramifications
A major problem arising from Mink is to determine under what
circumstances the initiation requirement's new particularization will or
will not be applied.64  Unfortunately, the Commission saw no need to
furnish any guidelines for current and future licensees trying to antici-
pate which issues are so critical that a failure to cover them will violate
the fairness doctrine.65 Its statement that the "issue has significant
and possibly unique impact on the licensee's service area" is little
help.
The probable chilling effect of so amorphous a standard is
evident. Licensees will primarily want to avoid the expense of legal
action and ongoing correspondence with the FCC. Unless and until
Mink is retracted or overruled, the existence of pollution, race, labor,
or school problems-to name only a few examples-in any particular
community will leave the local licensee with little choice about how to
fill its valuable news time. And once the anticipation of an FCC
reprimand forces a licensee to cover an issue it would rather have left
alone, the full-play requirement of the fairness doctrine will demand
still more of its time for opposing viewpoints.
Even assuming greater licensee caution, another immediate
ramification of Mink is the probable increase in the volume'of pleas
for FCC intervention upon radio licensees' failures to cover any alleged
locally salient issue. Would-be speakers will be less hesitant to sue
now that the barrier to actual issue selection has been crossed by the
FCC. Thus, Mink will make it increasingly difficult to turn away well-
documented invitations to participate in programming decisions con-
cerning "critical" issues. And any plausible complaint will engender
FCC involvement in the licensee's daily programming, at least in the
form of extensive-and expensive-requests for information concerning
what has or has not been covered."
64. Since Mink will not be appealed, see note 45 supra, current licensees will have to
operate with an awareness of it unless it is later overruled by the Commission itself or by the
courts. Judicial review of Commission orders and decisions is governed by 47 U.S.C. § 402
(1970), which provides for appeal only to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia.
65. Public Communications, Inc. 50 F.C.C.2d 395, 400, 32 RD. REG. (P & F) 2d 319, 324
(1974), mentioned briefly in Mink, suggests that the factors discussed in the Fairness Report,
note 26 supra, may be used as guidelines for determining the "must-cover" issues. However,
Public Communications emphasizes that "there are not, and in fact cannot be, any quantitative
standards against which one could measure the applicability of any or all of these three factors
to any particular issue." The curious point is that identification of the factors named in the
Fairness Report, or at least an allusion to them in the decision, would seem to be particularly
warranted in light of the result in Mink.
66. For the specificity of information required from, and procedure to be followed by
anyone bringing, a complaint before the Commission, see Memorandum Opinion and Order on
Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 36 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 1021
(1976).
A suggestion reviewed in NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974), surveys the
burdens a fairness hearing imposes on the licensee. The primary burdens arc legal and other
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C. Justifications Offered for Broadcast Regulation
The validity of Mink ultimately rests on first amendment theory.
More specifically, it rests on the justifications offered in the broad-
casting field for deviation from the hands-off approach to selection of
news program content by newspaper editors.
1. The Scarcity Rationale
The scarcity rationale, that radio is a unique mode of communica-
tion because it is "inherently not available to all," continues to be the
underlying premise of broadcast regulation. But radio frequencies
are the fruit of application of human knowledge to natural resources7
-the electromagnetic spectrum and the materials used in transmitting
and receiving facilities-as newspapers are the fruit of application of
human knolwedge to the exhaustible resources used in making such
facilities as printing presses. 8 While the degree of technological
difficulty in developing radio frequencies may exceed the degree of dif-
ficulty in developing a newspaper, it would indeed be difficult to imag-
ine any commodities that are "inherently available to all."
2. Limited Technology Rationale
The Supreme Court in Red Lion, in explaining the origin and
continued existence of broadcast regulation, offers a theoretically more
plausible "technological limits" rationale: "Only a tiny fraction . ..
can hope to communicate by radio at the same time . ..even if
the entire radio spectrum is utilized in the present state of commer-
cially acceptable technology." 69 That passage suggests that broad-
cast regulation was originally, and in part still is, based on the cir-
cumstance that only a limited number of facilities could be operated
simultaneously at a given level of technological achievement.
When saturation was first becoming apparent, governmental ac-
tion was needed to define and delimit the private property rights that
were in the process of being created by the application of human
monetary expenses, and the time that top-level station personnel must divert from regular
operations during the lengthy process from complaint to resolution. In Mink, the process ran
from September 1974 through June 1976.
67. Cf. Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio
and Television Regulation, 52 MiNN. L. Rav. 67 (1967) ("Airwaves." Le., the total spectrum
of useful frequencies, is shorthand for a phenomenon created by use of privately owned
transmission facilities.) See note 70 infra and accompanying text.
68. Cf. Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster's Dilemma, 32 GEo. WAsl.
L. REv. 719, 761 (1963) (All mass media are similarly limited, and limitations are essentially
economic); Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of Media Regula-
tion, 28 STAN. L. REv. 563, 575 (1976) (there is no strict physical limitation on expanding
spectrum utilization; similar economic limitations affect both print and broadcast media).
69. 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
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knowledge to a resource.70  The Federal Communications Commission,
however, was not established merely to define rights in order to
preclude electronic interference; it was also given "the burden of
determining the composition" of radio traffic." t  The apparent as-
sumptions underlying that decision, and continuing today, are that
those latecomers who want to use the airwaves either can not or
should not be required to develop new technology in order to expand
the airwaves' usefulness. The assumption that they can not has been
proven wrong by developments in the field.72
As to the belief that latecomers should not be required to develop
new technology, it is true that the early need for new technology to
further exploit the available resource sets radio apart from the print
media. But it is ironic that those in the forefront of radio's develop-
ment are to be penalized in favor of those who may either enter the
field later or never enter it at all. If the disparity among men's
creative abilities justifies the limits placed on property rights in the
broadcasting field, there is no reason it should not have the same effect
in other fields as well, including the print media.7
70. This proposition is set forth in Rand, The Property Statu. of Airwaves, in CAPITALISM:
THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 122 (A. Rand ed. 1967). Rand begins her essay by reviewing the source
of property rights:
Any material element or resource which, in order to become of use or value to
men, requires the application of human knowledge or effort, slould be private property
-by the right of those who apply the knowledge and effort. 1?his is particularly true of
broadcasting frequencies . . . because they are produced by human action and do not
exist without it.
She further suggests that what should have taken place is the electromagnetic equivalent of
the Homestead Act of 1862. The government would have been the custodian, rather than the
owner, of the undeveloped resource (the electromagnetic spectrum). It would have then im-
partially allocated the frequencies (i.e., the fruit of the application of human effort to the
resource) on a first-come, first-served basis, and any hopeful developer of a frequency would
have become its owner only after operation of it for a certain number of years, The govern-
ment would then have the continuing function of protecting the rights of each user from
electromagnetic interference by others.
For a thorough interdisciplinary plan for turning the electr:magnetic spectrum over to
private ownership, see De Vany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara, & Scott, A Properti S stemn for
Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Studl-, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1499 (1963). Part of their proposal for the transition from the current system
includes setting an expiration date for current licenses and auctioning off portions of the
spectrum to the highest bidders.
71. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943).
72. For the Court's own acknowledgement of that fact, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 397, 399 (1970).
73. Creative disparity would be entirely irrelevant unless the number wanting frequencies
was larger than the number of existing frequencies-again, the problem is reduced to one of
economic scarcity. But that is only the starting point for the question of how the scarce
commodity should be rationed. See generally Pierson, The Need for Modification of Section
326, 18 FED. ComNi. B.J. 15 (1963); Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent
Theory of Media Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 563 (1976). See generally text accompanying
note 79 infra. It is important to recognize in the context of a speaker desiring access to a
broadcaster's facilities, that the broadcaster's denial of the use of his facilities to the would-be
speaker no more denies the latter's freedom of speech than a man's denial of the use of his
automobile to another denies the latter's right to the use of transportation. The seeker is free to
speak or ride on the strength of, and to the extent of his own abilities, as is the producer
Broadcasting regulation conveniently ignores that the desired substances (facilities) are not
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3. Listeners' Rights Theory
The listeners' rights theory-that the rights of the listeners take
precedence over the rights of the broadcaster-is purportedly based in
Red Lion on the first amendment purpose of preserving "an unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas."74 However, it is also faulty as a pro-
regulation rationale. Implementation of the listeners' rights theory
under the initiation requirement contradicts the "uninhibited market-
place" function of the first amendment. The listeners' choices are
second-hand ones and will be "inhibited" by the program selections
of either the government or the licensee. But the broadcaster's role
as a buyer and seller in the marketplace is greatly inhibited when the
government determines what it will accept and, in turn, offer to its
listeners. 75 Thus, the marketplace itself affords less variety and be-
comes more of a forum for what the government believes ought to be
important to the public.
Of course, recognition of listeners' interests in receiving informa-
tion need not in all cases constrict the marketplace. Recognition of
a "right to receive" information has been used to free speakers from
governmental regulation rather than to impose it upon them. 76  The
first amendment distinction between using listeners' interests to deny,
rather than to grant, a speaker's freedom to set forth his own views
is an important one, as Federal Communications Commissioner Glen
0. Robinson has eloquently recognized:
[T]he listeners' rights theory makes nonsense out of the First Amend-
ment; in fact, it stands it on its head. The First Amendment may in-
deed belong to everybody-as the listeners' rights theory suggests-but
it cannot truly belong to everybody unless it first belongs to each and
every particular somebody. To deny the individual right in the name of
the collective right transforms the First Amendment from a guarantee
of individual freedom into its very opposite, rule by public clamor.
77
preexisting resources, thus making one man's produced or purchased property a means to an-
other's end and thereby denying the rights of the producer-in this case, property as well as
first amendment rights.
74. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1. 20
(1945)).
75. One fairness observer states "Mhe very function of a mass communicator is to select
from all available communications those which will be communicated." Pierson, The Need for
Modification of Section 326, 18 FED. COMM. B.J. 15, 25 (1963). In the full-play area, as well
as in the initiation area, the broadcaster's function as a market actor is undercut by govern-
mental intrusion. Ful-play enforcement means that the government, rather than the licensee,
has decided an issue is sufficiently controversial to require full treatment of all viewpoints after
the initial presentation.
76. See, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) and cases cited therein. In Virginia Board, plaintiff-consumers'
rights to receive drug price information were used as a basis for allowing them to assert
"pharmacists" rights to advertise their products.
77. Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58
F.C.C.2d 691, 707, 36 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 1021, 1040-41 (1976).
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4. Argument from Governmental Control
Red Lion offered a fourth justification for the regulation of broad-
cast content when it said that "the First Amendment confers no right
on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on 'their' frequencies
and no right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which
the Government has denied others the right to use.' ,78 The govern-
ment's original power to grant or deny the privilege to use the air-
waves is purportedly justified by the scarcity rationale and thus would
initially seem to fall with a recognition of the invalidity of that justifi-
cation. But a governmental regulation justification for broadcasting
regulation can and perhaps should continue to stand for another rea-
son, as long as the government-whatever its rationale-is in the busi-
ness of choosing who will and who will not be permitted to operate
frequencies. Under the current system-licensing on the basis of whose
programming will best serve the public interest-the programming of
those who have licenses carries the implicit approval of the govern-
ment. The imprimatur of the government, then, might be extended
to decisions based on the race of an idea's proponent if the licensee
is given absolute discretion to program on any basis it chooses.
Thus, when the difficulty of gaining access to the broadcast media
is caused by the government, an argument for broadcast content
regulation can perhaps be made under a scarcity-imprimatur theory.
The argument's validity may be limited, however, to the full-play
context. First, governmental refusal to require one of its licensees to
initiate coverage of a particular issue at most implies a very tenuous
governmental approval of any viewpoint on the untreated issue; but
refusal to require a licensee to grant reply time to a person or idea
that has been attacked yields a stronger inference that the govern-
ment favors the presented side of the question. Second, the intru-
sion on the broadcaster's content selection is less in enforcement of
the full-play requirement than in enforcement of the initiation require-
ment. In the full-play area the broadcaster has at least made the initial
choice of subject matter, while in the initiation context the entire
subject-matter decision-that the issue is sufficiently controversial to
warrant coverage-is made by the government.
Even in the full-play context, the scarcity portion of the scarcity-
imprimatur theory has a significant drawback. Despite governmental
regulation, commercial broadcast facilities today-even commercial
FM radio stations alone-are far more plentiful than daily and Sunday
newspapers combined. 79  And while the imprimatur portion of the
78. 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969) (emphasis added).
79. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1976
535, 539 (97th edition 1976). There were 2847 commercial FM stations in 1975, and the
combined total of daily and Sunday newspapers in 1975 was 1,756 The total number of com-
mercial radio facilities in that year was 7,335.
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argument from governmental regulation may have some validity in the
full-play context despite the relative lack of scarcity, it does not argue
for the retention of the underlying content-oriented licensing and
regulatory scheme.80
Had the government, early in radio's development, properly recog-
nized, defined, and delimited broadcast frequencies as the product
and property of those who created them, the justifications offered for
the first amendment distinction between news content selection in the
broadcast and print media, and their manifestation in Mink, would
not be with us. The station owner would have the same kind of first
amendment protection against the government as the individual with
his own unamplified voice and the editor with his own newspaper,
that is, he would have first amendment protection to select and offer
what he wanted to present rather than accepting and offering what the
government wanted him to present.
Complete governmental rights to the medium would obviate in a
different way the fairness doctrine and other public interest regula-
tion. Justice Douglas has hypothesized that if "[a] licensee...
[were] an arm of the government, [it] would be unable by reason of
the First Amendment to 'abridge' some sectors of thought in favor
of others,"8 thereby suggesting that access for all who wished to be
heard over the air would be the order of the day, assuming that were
possible.
Congress opted for neither of these alternatives, fixing the legal
rights to broadcast frequencies in the center of the spectrum between
absolute governmental control and the full complement of property
rights generally accorded the print media.82 The absence of exclusive
governmental control of the airwaves, according broadcasters greater
freedom than common carriers, 3 and the first amendment and statu-
80. See note 70 supra.
81. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 150 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Douglas also noted that the Court has not accepted his suggestion and concluded
therefrom that broadcasters' freedom should be identical to that accorded the print media.
82. The resulting concept of "public ownership" borders on absurdity in the broad-
casting context. There is no such entity as the public-the public is only a collection of
individuals. To say that the entire public owns radio frequencies by virtue of merely being
alive while saying that those who own and operate the facilities do not own the frequencies
resulting from such operation, completely ignores that the frequencies exist by virtue of the
ability and effort of that small number of individuals who created and maintain those requisite
facilities. See note 70 supra.
Even if public ownership were a viable concept, it would not point toward the regulation
of broadcasting as distinct from any other communications medium. See, e.g., Robinson,
The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regu-
lation, 52 MisN. L. REv. 67 (1967) (if public ownership justifies regulation, all types of speech
using airspace should be regulated, including bullhorns and back-fence gossip); Sullivan,
Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster's Dilemma, 32 GEO. WAs. L. REv. 719 (1963)
(if use of public domain allows censorship, no medium has right to be free); Pierson, The Need
For Modification of Section 326, 18 FED. COMM. BJ. 15 (1963) (ownership irrelevant,
though public ownership traditionally requires fewer rather than more restraints.)
83. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970).
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tory prohibitions against censorship suggest a governmental hands-off
attitude toward broadcasters similar to that taken toward the print
media. But since the licensees' legal rights in the frequencies created
by their facilities are limited, with much control over broadcasting
reposed in the government, 4 it should follow that licensees cannot
exclude from the air all but their own viewpoints.
These conflicting considerations could only yield a regulatory
scheme embodying similar conflicting considerations and render
almost impossible the task of defining "censorship" in regard to a
medium simultaneously allocated between broadcasters and the pub-
lic. The fairness doctrine as enforced in Mink is an excellent example
of that proposition. The government's role was a limited one, de-
termining only whether or not WHAR had acted reasonably and in
good faith. Having found that failure to cover a particular issue was
unreasonable and not in good faith, the remedy was governmental
selection of what the broadcaster would cover-a remedy that would
clearly be censorship if the broadcaster's legal right to the frequency
created by its facility paralleled the newspaper publisher's legal right
to the use of his facilities.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to articulate a complete
proposal for the abolition of public interest content regulation in
broadcasting. Indeed, such an abolition is unlikely to occur, for the
regulatory scheme has been with us for over fifty years and the Court
and the Commission are undoubtedly convinced that it maximizes the
total benefit from the broadcast media to all concerned. " Nonethe-
less, the degree of governmental intrusion into licensees' freedom to
select programming matter evidenced in Mink suggests that if the
first amendment protects broadcasting, it does so only in fields other
than news presentation. 6  This obliteration of the concept of a free
84. 47 U.S.C. § 301 reads in part: "It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to maintain
control of the United States over all the channels . . . and to provide for the use of such
channels, but not the ownership thereof, under licenses .... "
85. The Supreme Court in Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367, evidenczd its reluctance to abandon
the "inherent scarcity" rationale as a basis for distinction between the print and broadcast
media, saying, "It is enough to say that the resource is one of considerable and growing
importance whose scarcity impelled its regulation by an agency authorized by Congress."
Id. at 399. The Court also noted that "advances in technology, ,uch as microwave transmis-
sion, have led to more efficient utilization of the frequency spectrum, but uses for that spectrum
have also grown apace." Id. at 396-97. The latter statement is simply an expression of the
economic scarcity situation which exists as well in the print media. See notes 68 and 79 supra.
86. Two recent developments suggest a desire to at least keep the Commission out of
entertainment programming. In Writer's Guild v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1069, 1143 (C.D, Cal.
1976) the court found that the National Association of Broadcasters "family hour" policy was
a result of FCC pressure, and stated that the networks have "a First Amendment and statutory
duty to program exclusively on the basis of their independent judgment."
The Commission itself affirmed its intention to stay out of entertainment programming in
an inquiry into Citizens Committee to Save WEFM, Inc. v. FCC, 506 F2d 246 (D.C Cir,
1974). The Commission's report can be found in 45 U.S.L.W. 2114, August 24, 1976. The
Commission states, at 2115:
In summary, FCC regulation of entertainment format as an aspect of the public
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market of voluntarily exchanged ideas is particularly unjustified in
light of the invalidity of its central premise, the scarcity rationale.
IV. CONCLUSION
The first amendment attitude of the Supreme Court of the United
States toward the print media is that the government has no business
determining news program content. In stark contrast, the Court
sanctions governmental regulation of program content in the broad-
cast media. The Federal Communications Commission, charged with
simultaneously avoiding censorship and regulating news broadcasting,
performs its duties largely through the fairness doctrine.
The Commission's unconsidered decision in Mink makes it quite
clear that broadcast content regulation and freedom of speech cannot
coexist. Freedom of information and thought would have been better
served in this ostensibly free society if the Mink decision had not
extended federal control of broadcast content to selection of news
issues to be discussed. If this decision is to have any value at all
in our legal structure, it is that it may foster a thorough reconsidera-
tion of the Supreme Court's and the Commission's first amendment
approach to the broadcast media.
Robert A. Weible
interest would produce an unnecessary and menacing entanglement in matters that
Congress meant to leave to private discretion. Any such regulatory scheme would be
flatly inconsistent with congressional policy as manifested in the Communications Act,
counterproductive in terms of maximizing the welfare of the radio-listening public,
an administrative nightmare, and unconstitutional as impermissibly chilling innova-
tion and experimentation in radio programming." •
Unfortunately, neither the Court in Writer's Guild, decided five months after Mink, nor
the Commission, whose inquiry came just two months after Mink, reveals the distinction be-
tween news and entertainment that erases in the news context the licensee's duty to program
exclusively on the basis of his own judgment, or the "menacing entanglement" that regula-
tion of format would produce.
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